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Cost/Benefit of Litigation in Fishery Management
More Than Meets the Eye:
The Transaction Costs of Litigation
Dr. Susan Hanna25
I am going to be talking about some of the costs of litigation, and what
I am going to be discussing today is not the result of a formal research
project or a calculation of costs associated with litigation. What I will
present are reflections and perspectives from the point of view of someone
who participates in the fishery management system as a scientific adviser.
So, it is in part a view from inside the regional management council system
and, in part, the perspective of an outsider participating in that system as an
adviser to the Pacific Fishery Management Council (PFMC) and to NMFS.
The perspective that I have is also the perspective of an economist, who has
seen the cost effects of litigation roll through the fishery management
system. I interpret litigation as an economist, and I look at the bundle of
costs litigation imposes on the fishery management system.
Since the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, we have seen an increase
in the amount of litigation challenging fishery management decisions. An
article in the June 2001 issue of National Fisherman indicated that the
number of suits against the National Marine Fisheries Service had more
than doubled in the past five years.26 I do not know if this figure is
accurate, but that was the order of magnitude cited. The suits are coming
from a number of different interests, including commercial fishermen,
recreational fishermen, environmental organizations, and tribes, all of
whom are challenging a number of different aspects of the fishery
management system. Challenges are being made to the quality of the data
and analysis, as in the Hawaiian longline turtle case.27 Challenges are
being made to the completeness of the analysis, as in the North Pacific
Steller sea lion interactions with the cod, pollock and atka mackerel
fisheries.28 Challenges are being made to force adherence to the regulatory
process, as in the highly migratory species plan.29 Challenges are also
being made to the legitimacy of management decisions, as in the reduction
of the summer flounder quota. 0
25. Professor of Economics, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at
Oregon State University.
26. Richard Bard, Full-Court Press, NAT'L FISHERMAN, June 2001, at 22.
27. Leatherback Sea Turtle v. NMFS, Civ. No. 99-00152DAE (D. Haw. 1999).
28. Greenpeace v. NMFS, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
29. Bluewater Fisherman's Ass'n v. Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2000).
30. See supra note 4.
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These different groups obviously have different perspectives, but I
think it is fair to say that from the perspective of any particular group
bringing litigation, the objective is to improve the performance of the
fishery management system. Whether the objective is seen as improving
performance through better conservation, improving the allocation of fish
stocks, the making of more complete assessments of economic and social
impacts, or creating an overall more effective management process,
depends on the parties involved in the litigation.
As we see these suits increase, we are also seeing a change in where
decisions are being made. Litigation is moving many management
decisions out of the arena of the fishery management councils and NMFS
and into the courts. As more management decisions are made by the courts,
we are seeing a movement away from participatory management toward a
more command and control kind of decision-making process. This
movement has some implications for the costs of management and how
these costs are distributed. The relevant question for fishery management
is whether or not litigation, as a tool and a strategy, will improve fishery
management over the short or long term, or whether it will leave permanent
damage in its wake.
One way to look at the question of management performance is to look
at the costs associated with management. When we talk about the
performance of fishery management, we are talking about the rather
restricted notion of cost-effectiveness, because fishery management
proceeds according to standards specified by law. The real question is how
effectively those standards can be met, and whether they can be met in the
most cost effective way. The ideal is to conduct fishery management by the
least-costly means possible. Of course, the ideal is not the reality, but the
question of how actions create costs within the management system and the
overall size of the cost burden is very relevant to the effectiveness of
fishery management.
The types of costs most relevant to fishery management are transaction
costs. Transaction costs are the costs of arranging everything that
contributes to management: gathering information, negotiating among all
the different interests, designing the regulations, implementing the
regulations, monitoring compliance with the regulations, and enforcing the
regulations. Transaction costs are costs that are absorbed by agency staff,
council staff, commercial fishermen, recreational fishermen, scientific
advisers, and all other participants. The costs of running the fishery
management system are borne by all the participants, so the cost burden
that you create is very relevant to the system's effectiveness.
It is important to recognize when you look at this question of litigation
that we are walking in the path of history. We are not just looking at
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litigation independent of everything else that is taking place in manage-
ment. We have a management system that has become increasingly
burdened with transaction costs over time. Twenty-four years of imple-
mentation of the Magnuson-Stevens Act has been chronically underfunded
in data collection and analysis of regulatory action. Transaction costs have
increased over the twenty-four years of implementation with increasing
overcapacity, allocation conflicts, and a host of other sources of increasing
pressure on the system. New management requirements added through the
Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 that were also underfunded further
increased the cost burden on management. These new requirements were
layered over the old requirements and over a human capital base that was
already stretched thin. Litigation adds a new layer of required actions and
responses that have their own set of costs. The costs of litigation are
layered onto what many feel is an overburdened and underfunded system.
Litigation creates new costs, such as the opportunity cost of lost
personnel resources. An example of the opportunity cost of lost personnel
is the entrainment of scientists in the preparation of material for court
cases. Someone in NMFS used the term "insanely complete" to describe
the paperwork and record-keeping associated with creating an NMFS
administrative record. The paperwork involved diverts personnel from
other activities and dedicates them to the preparation of court cases. Chaos
can be created in the fishery management council system when everything
else comes to a halt in order to prepare for litigation.
Leatherback Sea Turtle v. National Marine Fisheries Service31 presents
one of the most striking cases of the opportunity cost of using scientists to
prepare materials for court. In this case, the Honolulu lab of NMFS was
asked to prepare the biological opinion for trial. That involved the
dedication of the time-equivalent of eight senior scientists for one year in
order to prepare the biological opinion. In the meantime, the routine kinds
of analysis needed by the fishery management council were not done. The
cost of preparing material for litigation was the loss of the routine work of
fishery management.
Another cost of litigation can be observed in the polarization of partici-
pants. I have observed this in the Pacific fishery management system,
where even the threat of litigation causes polarization. Although the PFMC
has not yet engaged in active litigation, the threat of litigation is causing
extreme polarization among participants. This leads to strategies aimed at
undermining other people's decisions and to parties taking actions that are
31. Civ. No. 99-00152DAE (D.Haw. 1999).
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damaging to a system based on participation, negotiation, interaction, and
communication.
The continued burden of allocation means that the fishery management
system dedicates an enormous amount of time to analysis, documentation,
and data collection, as a result of the need to divide fishery resources
among competing interests. As overcapacity and fishing pressure increases,
the amount of time and analysis required to do that has increased. The
allocation bur-den has not gone away. In fact, as both resource scarcity and
the potential for litigation have increased, it has become even more
exaggerated.
These are some of the more obvious cost outcomes of litigation that
result from taking personnel away from tasks that are part of the routine
requirements of fishery management. As the threat of litigation becomes
more active, there is an increasing unwillingness on the part of the councils
to experiment with alternative approaches to management problems for fear
of litigation. Management decision-making is not focused on outcomes, but
on process. Councils are refraining from action in order to consider how
that action will look in terms of possible litigation. This comes at a cost to
flexibility in management and to solution-based management approaches.
Another cost outcome of litigation is very high rates of discounting of
future benefits. By that I mean that managers do not have the luxury of
looking far into the future because the scarcity, allocation battles, and the
threat of negative consequences resulting from a particular action are all
shortening the time horizon managers operate within. People are trying to
stumble through an annual cycle and they are attempting to do as good a
job as they can in order to stretch the resources as far as possible. This is
not the long-term management for fishery sustainability that is supposed to
be our social objective.
There is also an erosion of legitimacy of participatory management,
because some of the strategies of engaging and positioning oneself in
litigation have to do with undermining the credibility of the science and
undermining the credibility of the analysts. The effect of these strategies
is to slowly erode the perception that the participatory system is a
legitimate system, and that negotiations can proceed in good faith.
The last explicit cost outcome I will discuss seems to me to be a very
costly one. It is that in focusing and preparing for litigation, we are missing
opportunities to step back and address the root causes of the problems that
are leading to litigation, such as overcapacity and fishing pressure. Addres-
sing these root causes of our problems would provide the needed flexibility
to find better ways to fish more cleanly and to introduce more stewardship-
type behavior into the decision-making process over the long-term.
[Vol. 7:1
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These are some of the more explicit cost outcomes, but I would like to
add another that seems to me to be damaging as well. It is the creeping
erosion of morale among scientists and technical people participating in the
management system, as well as, among the user groups. In the PFMC, for
example, there has been an increasing level of disenchantment in recent
years that is very troubling, because good faith participation is the basis for
the fishery management system.
There is a general erosion of morale, as well as, specific problems with
morale. Attacks on the credibility of the science or the quality of the
analysis can be taken very personally by some scientists, who get tired of
being constantly under attack. One perspective is that there is nothing
personal in these attacks, and that they are just a strategy or contrary point
of view applied generally to the agency or system as a whole. However, if
you are a stock assessment scientist standing up at a stock assessment
review meeting, and you are under constant attack, and the kinds of attack
become much less professional and more personal over time, then you
naturally begin to take these attacks personally. A person's enthusiasm and
interest in continuing to participate in the system erodes.
As a university participant of the Scientific and Statistical Committee
of the Pacific Council, I have felt that very keenly myself. You feel like
you are volunteering time to participate in the system, and whatever you do
will be subject to attack both professionally and personally. Those are
some of the costs that are harder to measure. These types of costs are
harder to get your hands on, but they are very real.
Transaction costs are a necessary part of fishery management. The
whole idea is to contain them and to keep them from getting out of hand,
so they do not overburden the system or overwhelm the benefits you are
getting out of the system. How do we escape these costs associated with
litigation? How do we get out of the increasing cost burden placed on the
management system? One suggestion is to break the cycle of insufficient
funding to collect adequate data, to do the analysis, and to hire additional
scientists to do the analysis. NMFS has taken steps to increase the social
science component, however, in terms of the requirement to manage for a
maximum net national benefit and to analyze human impacts, NMFS's
steps are rather small. We have to find some way to get realistic about the
amount of funding that this system requires, if we expect it to do what the
law requires.
The most important thing is to start addressing the root causes of the
problem. Instead of throwing all our resources toward litigation, we should
try to fix some of the underlying causes that encourage litigation. As an
economist, I see the root causes as the horrible levels of overcapacity and
all of the attendant problems associated with overcapacity. These come out
20011
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of our failure to specify property rights, responsibilities and expectations
for those participating in the fisheries, and a subsequent failure to manage
fisheries so that they are economically productive, where participants can
actively and profitably participate in sustainable fisheries.
We also need to move our focus away from the regulatory process,
where the system is currently focused, and to start looking at performance
outcomes. We are not providing incentives for people to achieve certain
targeted outcomes. Instead, we are saying that they must follow a parti-
cular process. We need to realign those incentives to get the focus on the
kinds of sustainability outcomes that we feel are socially desirable and that
allow people some flexibility to experiment and work toward those
outcomes.
I am sure you can tell from my remarks that I am troubled by the
amount of litigation facing the U.S. fishery management system. I see an
increasing cost burden on the management system, and from my perspec-
tive, the effects of this burden are troubling. I am very concerned about the
indirect, erosive kinds of costs that I see working at the legitimacy of the
system, and I hope that we can find a way to contain these costs and change
the current trend.
Question
I have two related questions. First, in your talk you make one
assumption that I want to challenge. Is it necessarily true that, were it not
for litigation and the burdens associated with litigation on scientists and
managers, they would do a better job of fishery management?
Second, it seems to me that this really ought to be a cost-benefit
analysis. You talked a lot about the transaction costs of litigation, but very
little about the benefits that are associated with the flow from litigation. I
wonder if the real problem or challenge with the legitimacy of the agency's
work today stems from their failure to address those root causes that you
talked about rather than the effect of litigation?
Susan Hanna
Obviously the benefits of litigation are critical, they just do not happen
to be my piece of this panel. The benefits are likely to be long-term, and
whether this is the right strategy to get us to those goals is an open question
from my perspective. A piece of that question is the cost burden introduced
to the system and whether it is keeping the system from getting to the
benefits by overwhelming it, or whether it will be the nudge that the system
needs. Obviously, that is an open question.
I think your point about the litigation costs and whether or not those are
keeping the system from being effectively managed is a fair one. I would
not argue that were it not for litigation the system would be clicking along
[Vol. 7:1
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smoothly. The problems in the system, namely the chronic underfunding
and lack of attention paid to the root causes, have been there for some time.
From my perspective, in terms of costs, the litigation just happens to be
introducing significant new costs to a system that is already staggering
ineffectively under its existing cost burden.
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